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THE SINGAPORE CHILL:                                      
POLITICAL DEFAMATION AND THE NORMALIZATION 
OF A STATIST RULE OF LAW 
Cameron Sim† 
Abstract: Recent cases involving opposition politicians and foreign publications, 
in which allegations of corruption leveled against both the executive and the judiciary 
were found to be defamatory and in contempt of court, struck at the heart of Singapore’s 
ideological platform as a corruption-free meritocracy with an independent judiciary.  This 
article examines the implications of these cases for the relationship between the courts, 
the government, and the rule of law in Singapore.  It is argued that judicial normalization 
of the government’s politics of communitarian legalism has created a statist and 
procedural rule of law that encourages defamation laws to chill political opposition.  The 
dual state construct in Singapore, under which commercial law remains depoliticized and 
readily enforceable, has been distorted, which creates uncertainty across all areas of 
Singapore’s common law and thereby undermines the government’s economic agenda. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A key concept in the ideological framework of Singapore’s governing 
People’s Action Party (“PAP”) is providing certainty and security for 
Singapore’s economy through the centrality of a platform of anti-
corruption.1  Part of the emphasis on international investment and economic 
development in Singapore is premised on the basis that Singapore is 
corruption-free.2  Preventative legislation,3 departments such as the Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau, and high salaries paid to public servants,4 all 
serve to strengthen this anti-corruption platform.  Singapore consistently 
ranks highly in international corruption standings.5  When the integrity of the 
government is brought into question, it is not uncommon for Singapore’s 
                                           
†
 BA, LLB (Hons) (Melb); Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria; Solicitor and Barrister of the 
High Court of Australia. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. I would 
also like to thank the members of the journal, in particular Wyatt Golding and Amber Penn-Roco, for their 
efforts in the editorial process. 
1
  LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST, THE SINGAPORE STORY: 1965-2000 157 (2000). 
2
  See Li-Ann Thio, Rule of Law within a Non-Liberal “Communitarian” Democracy: The 
Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE 
OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 183, 192-3 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004). 
3
  See, e.g., Prevention of Corruption Act, ch. 241 (1960) (Sing.). 
4
  High salaries paid to public servants are allegedly seen by the government as affirming an ancient 
Confucian precept to pay good people to encourage them to work for the government.  See Goh Chok 
Tong, Senior Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the 2000 National Day Rally (Aug. 9, 2000), 
in STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 21, 2000, at 35. 
5
  In 2010, Singapore was ranked first in the World Competitive Yearbook.  See INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT, WORLD COMPETITIVE YEARBOOK 1 (2010), 
http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf. 
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government to protect this image through the courts by launching 
defamation suits as a mechanism to deny these allegations.  The trend of the 
past four decades in this area of the law is striking in its consistency: neither 
former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew nor current Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong have ever lost a defamation action.6  Singapore’s Court of Appeal has 
even stated that Lee Kuan Yew “is almost universally acknowledged as the 
architect of Singapore’s corruption-free government,”7 and it is within 
Singapore’s courts that Lee Kuan Yew’s reputation has always been 
successfully defended. 
The government of Singapore perceives that there is a campaign being 
waged against Singapore’s courts, which seeks to cast doubt on the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary.8  The judiciary has made clear that it will 
not tolerate any attempts to undermine public confidence in the courts “by 
making false and scandalous allegations.”9  In July 2005, a scandal erupted 
in Singapore over the handling of the National Kidney Foundation’s 
(“NKF”) funds (commonly referred to as the “NKF scandal”).  The judiciary 
has since said that to link an institution with the NKF scandal is to “sully 
their standing and integrity,”10 and that NKF has become a “byword for 
corruption, financial impropriety and the knowing abuse of unmeritorious 
defamation suits.”11  Such an association would be patently at odds with the 
government’s ideological, corruption-free framework.  In two recent sets of 
                                           
6
  See, e.g., Harbans Singh Sidha v. Pub. Prosecutor, 1 Malayan L. J. 41 (1973); Lee Kuan Yew v. 
J.B. Jeyaretnam, 1 Malayan L. J. 281 (1979); J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, 1 Malayan L. J. 239 
(1982); J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, 1 Malayan L. J. 97 (1984); Lee Kuan Yew v. Scow Khee Leng, 
1 Malayan L. J. 11 (1986); Lee Kuan Yew v. Scow Khee Leng, 1 Malayan L. J. 172 (1989); Lee Kuan Yew 
v. Derek Gwyn Davis & Ors, 1 Malayan L. J. 390 (1990); Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam JB (No. 1), 1 Sing. 
L. Rep. 688 (1990); Lee Kuan Yew v. Chin Vui Khen & Anor, 3 Malayan L. J. 494 (1991); Jeyaretnam 
J.B. v. Lee Kuan Yew, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 310 (1992); Lee Kuan Yew v. Devan Nair (Straits Times Press 
(1975) Ltd. & Anor, third parties), 1 Sing. L. Rep. 723 (1993); Lee Kuan Yew & Anor v. Vinocur & Ors, 3 
Sing. L. Rep. 477 (1995); Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong (No. 1), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 819 (1997); Lee 
Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong (No. 2), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 833 (1997); Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong 
(No. 3), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 841 (1997); Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong & Anor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 178 
(1997); Tang Liang Hong v. Lee Kuan Yew & Anor, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 97 (1998); Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee 
Soon Juan, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 8 (2003); Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan (No. 2), 1 Sing. L. Rep. 552 
(2005); Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party & Ors, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675 (2007); Review Publ’g 
Co. v. Lee Hsien Loong, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 52 (2010). 
7
  Review Publ’g Co. v. Lee Hsien Loong, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 52, 85 (2010).  
8
  See Walter Woon, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore, Speech at the 
Singapore Academy of Law (Jan. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.sal.org.sg/Lists/Speeches/DispForm.aspx?ID=60. 
9
  See Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the Singapore 
Academic of Law (Jan. 3, 2009). 
10
  Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 582, 626 (2006). 
11
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 702 (2007). 
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defamation cases, the opposition Singapore Democratic Party,12 and foreign 
publication the Far Eastern Economic Review,13 both dared to make an 
association between the government and the NKF scandal. These cases 
provide a practical paradigm within which the rule of law in Singapore can 
be situated.  At the same time, consideration of related contempt of court 
proceedings allows for an examination of the government’s claim that the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary is under attack.14  Together, these 
cases provide a unique insight into the relationship between the courts, the 
government, and the rule of law in Singapore. 15 
This article suggests that the applicability of any dual state construct 
in Singapore, where economic liberalism coexists with political illiberalism, 
is inconsistent and has become distorted.  Whilst Singapore’s statist 
limitation of rights has been justified as necessary to create a stable state and 
economic regime, this limitation has now undermined those goals through 
increasing uncertainty in Singapore’s common law.  In a dual state system, it 
is alleged that the rule of law is used not to subvert or restrain the power of 
the state, but to reinforce it and provide for an expansion and rationalization 
of state power.16  The rule of law is manipulated as a legitimating ideology 
to show that the economy is strong because of effective forms of 
governance, but at the same time it is abused to silence opposition politicians 
and create a system of rule through law.17  The law is thereby bifurcated,18 
insofar as commercial law remains depoliticized and paramount to 
encourage investment, facilitated through strong legal institutions, yet there 
                                           
12
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party & Ors, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675 (2007), aff’d, Lee 
Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 757 (2008). 
13
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publ’g Co., 1 Sing. L. Rep. 167 (2009), aff’d, Review Publ’g Co. v. 
Lee Hsien Loong, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 52 (2010). 
14
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 642 (2009); Att’y-Gen. v. Tan 
Liang Joo John & Others, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 1132 (2009); Att’y-Gen. v. Hertzberg Daniel, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 
1103 (2009).  
15
 Even more recent developments involving contempt and criminal defamation proceedings against 
Alan Shadrake following the publication of his book, ONCE A JOLLY HANGMAN: SINGAPORE JUSTICE IN 
THE DOCK (2010), occurred too late for consideration in this article.  Comments made in the book were 
held to impugn the impartiality, integrity, and independence of the Singapore judiciary. See Att’y-Gen. v. 
Shadrake Alan, S.G.H.C. 339 (2010).  Shadrake was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment for contempt of 
court.  Criminal defamation proceedings, which carry imprisonment terms of up to two years, are pending 
at the time of publication of this article.  Future analysis of the outcome of these cases will undoubtedly be 
beneficial for understanding these areas of Singapore law.  
16
  See Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Rule of Law and Governance in the East Asian State, 1 
AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 107, 112 (1999). 
17
  Id. at 117-8. 
18
  See Ross Worthington, Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary 
Judiciary in Singapore, 28(4) J. OF L. & SOC’Y 491, 497 (2001). 
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is no expansion of rights in the public sphere.19  This article suggests that the 
economic ramifications of political decisions, exemplified by the recent 
defamation and contempt cases, erodes the foundations of any dual state 
construct and creates uncertainty in Singapore’s legal precedent, which 
thereby undermines and frustrates the government’s agenda of effective 
governance in a strong and stable corruption-free market economy. 
This article begins by scrutinizing the concept of the rule of law, and 
questions whether a statist and procedural rule of law has emerged in 
Singapore.  Next, the article examines freedom of speech in Singapore.  This 
is followed by an analysis of recent defamation cases and contempt of court 
proceedings concerning the NKF scandal, and their implications for 
opposition politicians and foreign publications in Singapore.  The article 
concludes that Singapore’s defamation laws are used to chill political 
opposition and promote a judicially-accepted narrow framework within 
which the rule of law fails to attain sufficiently meritorious value.  As this 
article terms it, the tropical island state thereby subsists under “the 
Singapore Chill,” whereby the risks of legal liability deter Singaporeans and 
others from making socially valuable comments and instead persuades them 
to maintain their silence.20 This leads to a chilling effect on the freedom of 
speech and political opposition in Singapore and has the unintended 
consequence of chilling investment stability.21 
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN SINGAPORE 
The application of normative and Eurocentric jurisprudential concepts 
to places with different legal traditions must be undertaken with caution, and 
the rule of law must always be placed in its historical and political context.22   
However, Lee Kuan Yew has said that the rule of law in Singapore is “no 
cliché,”23 not “an empty slogan,”24 and that Singapore’s reputation for the 
                                           
19
  See Roman Tomasic & Bahrin Kamarul, The Rule of Law and Corporate Insolvency in Six Asian 
Legal Systems, 7 CANTERBURY L. REV. 140, 147 (1998-2000). 
20
  See Andrew Kenyon, Investigating Chilling Effects: News Media and Public Speech in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Australia, 4 INT’L J. OF COMM. 440, 442 (2010), for a useful discussion of the concept of 
chilling speech. 
21
  See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
22
  See, e.g., PENELOPE NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS: THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALIST 
VIETNAM 11-30 (2007). 
23
  Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the Opening of the 
Singapore Academy of Law (Aug. 31, 1990) (Yew stated, “[i]f the government had failed to establish the 
basics for political stability and social cohesion, the rule of law would have become an empty slogan in a 
broken-backed Singapore.  But we have succeeded, and the rule of law today in Singapore is no cliché.”).  
24
  Id. 
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rule of law “has been and is a valuable economic asset,”25 which is 
“[i]mportant for investors and economic growth.”26  Therefore, concerns 
about exporting a foreign concept are not central in the Singaporean context. 
A. Substantive versus Procedural  
The value of a rule of law depends on the value of law, which itself 
depends on how law is conceived.  The rule of law in Singapore is seen to 
have European origins, which invites an analysis of what that rule 
signifies.27  Whilst by no means the only approach to the rule of law, Dicey 
enunciated three tenets:28 first, that law has supreme authority and limits the 
arbitrary exercise of power;29 second, that all are equally subject to the law;30 
and third, that the law is maintained by an independent judiciary which 
protects the rights of citizens.31  The liberal origins of Dicey’s tenets 
recognize the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in addition to the rule 
of law.32  Dicey argued that this parliamentary sovereignty however exists 
alongside the authority of judges determining the meaning of the law,33 and 
the principle of representative democracy.34  Dicey’s thoughts were premised 
on the assumption that all liberal democracies have functioning oppositions. 
Whilst from one perspective the Diceyan concept represents a thin rule of 
law, insofar as it might allow unjust laws to come into being through an 
overly formalistic approach, the presence of a functioning opposition 
generally dilutes any such concerns. 
However, the assumption that state acts and laws can be tested by an 
independent judiciary is not necessarily guaranteed where one party controls 
the political scene.  Singapore’s judiciary has indicated that it will only test 
laws to confirm they have been enacted in accordance with correct 
procedure and will remain indifferent as to whether the law was “fair, just 
                                           
25
  See Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way, 30 HONG 
KONG L. J. 91, 110 (2000) (citing 65 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, col 236 (Nov. 2, 1995)).  
26
  Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Keynote Address at the 
Opening of the International Bar Association Conference (Oct. 14, 2007). 
27
  HAN FOOK KWANG, WARREN FERNANDEZ, & SUMIKO TAN, LEE KUAN YEW: THE MAN AND HIS 
IDEAS 411 (1998) (citing Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech to the 
University of Singapore Law Society (Jan. 18, 1962) (Yew stated, “[t]he rule of law talks of … concepts 
which first stemmed from the French Revolution and were later refined in Victorian England.”). 
28
  ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188-96 
(10th ed. 1959).  Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  
29
  DICEY, supra note 28, at 188.  
30
  Id. at 193. 
31
  Id. at 195-6. 
32
  Id. at 39-40. 
33
  Id. at 407.  
34
  Id. at 83.  
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and reasonable.”35  In following a thin interpretation of a thin rule of law, 
where the judiciary is apathetic to the fairness, justness, and reasonableness 
of laws imposed by government,36 Singapore’s judiciary might thereby give 
deference to the executive in interpreting those laws. 
This distinction highlights that there is a need to distinguish between a 
procedural, rule-book, and thin rule of law, and a substantive, rights-based, 
thick rule of law.37  With the concession that the rule of law is such a 
contested concept,38 what the rule of law embodies in Singapore will depend 
on which side of politics the inquiry is addressed to.  According to Li-Ann 
Thio, the PAP favors a thinner rule of law, whereas opposition politicians 
desire a thicker and more rights-based rule.39  The government’s rule of law 
has been used as a tool to stabilize the country to enable certainty in 
investment and commerce.40  The rule of law has been “Singaporeanized” 
and is politically inert in an otherwise economically dynamic country where 
“economic modernisation [has] occurred sans political liberalisation.”41  
Singapore’s rule of law is not focused on democracy, but is rather concerned 
to secure stability to entice foreign investment.42  This stability is further 
secured through the prioritization of community interests and constructed 
Confucianist values.43 
On one analysis, Singapore’s judiciary has embraced a form of 
communitarian legalism, whereby the rights of the state trump those of the 
individual.44  In defamation cases, the courts must determine the balance 
between protecting free speech, and protecting the perceived integrity of 
                                           
35
  Jabar bin Kadermastan v. Pub. Prosecutor, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 617, 631B (1995).  
36
  Id. 
37
  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1985); Paul Craig, Formal and 
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, PUBLIC L. REV. 476 (1997); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BOSTON U. L. REV. 781, 784-91 (1989). See also 
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW (2nd ed. 1969). 
38
  See, e.g., HLA Hart, Book Review of the Morality of Law, 78 HARVARD L. REV. 1281, 1285-6 
(1965). 
39
  See Thio, supra note 2, at 183-4. 
40
  See Li-Ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 
20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 22, 24 (2002). 
41
  Id. at 25.  
42
  Id.  See also Thio, supra note 2, at 191-3; Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 1, at 73 (Yew stated,  “[t]he 
history of our financial centre is the story of how we built up credibility as a place of integrity, and 
developed the officers with the knowledge and skills to regulate and supervise the banks, security houses, 
and other financial institutions so that the risk of systemic failure is minimized.”).  Lee Kuan Yew, supra 
note 1, at 491 (Yew stated, “Singapore depends on the strength and influence of the family to keep society 
orderly and maintain a culture of thrift, hard work, filial piety, and respect for elders and for scholarship 
and learning. These values make for a productive people and help economic growth.”).  
43
  See Thio, supra note 40, at 26.   
44
  See Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, “We” v. “I”: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 
AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 1, 11-18 (2002). 
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Singapore’s leaders.  This is more than a “subtle tension” between protecting 
the interests of the community at large over constitutional protection to 
individuals.45  It is a fundamental tension.  The PAP justifies this approach 
by the concept of the junzi,46 part and parcel of their emphasis placed on 
Asian values,47 and moral legitimacy,48 in order to protect the economic 
stability of Singapore.  The method of using the rule of law to entice foreign 
investment through public order has gained judicial acceptance.49  However, 
this method of protecting economic stability is questionable.  One perception 
is that commercial laws are developed through harmonization and a 
universalist approach to ensure commercial certainty and stability,50 whereas 
non-commercial laws are applied with this emphasis on communitarian and 
essentially relativist values.51 
B. Judicial Normalization of a Statist Rule of Law 
The judiciary’s acceptance of the PAP’s framework can be viewed as 
implicit approval of the policy of exceptionalism so fundamental to the 
PAP’s rule.  Rather than focusing on civil-political rights, the focus from 
1959 to 1990 was on socio-economic rights.52  According to Lee Kuan Yew, 
Singapore has shaken itself free “from the confines of English norms which 
did not accord with the customs and values of Singapore society,” as a result 
of Singapore’s “traditional Asian value system, which places the interests of 
the community over and above that of the individual.”53  Elements of British 
colonialism, which emphasized strong executive power to establish the 
colony, have remained.54  In the words of Yong Pung How, C.J., the 
“sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the 
paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything … which tend[s] to run 
                                           
45
  Cf. id. at 7.  
46
  Junzi is a Confucian term referring to the ideal human. 
47
  See also White Paper on Singapore’s Shared Values (Cmd. 1 of 1991), 8 (stating that, “[t]he 
concept of government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do right for the people, and who have 
the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than the Western idea that a government should be 
given as limited powers as possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven 
otherwise.”). 
48
  Thio, supra note 40, at 27. 
49
  See, e.g., Yong Pung How, Former Chief Justice of Singapore, Speech at the Legal Service Dinner 
(Apr. 6, 2001).  See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
50
  See Thio, supra note 40, at 29.  See also Tan, supra note 25, at 91-92. 
51
  See Thio, supra note 40, at 29. 
52
  See Tan, supra note 44, at 11. 
53
  See Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the Opening of 
the Singapore Academy of Law (Aug. 31, 1990), available at 2(2) SING. ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 155, 
155 (1990).  
54
  See Tomasic & Kamarul, supra note 19, at 147.  See also Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 23, at 412. 
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counter to these objectives must be restrained.”55  The judiciary has taken 
judicial notice of the community in Singapore, and that political debate and 
commentary in many Western liberal democracies is “anathema” to 
Singapore’s political system.56 
On this approach, the relationship between the judiciary and the 
executive then becomes closer and results in acceptance of a thin rule of law 
under which the judiciary has normalized, legitimized, and augmented the 
PAP’s desired state of affairs.57  This “close and consultative relationship”58 
between the executive and the judiciary might better be characterized as a 
division of power within the executive, rather than some broader separation 
of powers.59  This does not mean that there is direct and deliberate executive 
interference with (or consultation on) judicial decision-making.  Rather, the 
judiciary’s normalization of the executive’s agenda is more subtle and 
indirect.  This state of affairs is part of a statist regime of legalism: branches 
of government are not separated, but divided.  Criticisms of this argument, 
leveled at the fact that the Singaporean legal system has international 
legitimacy,60 ignore the rival fact that this international legitimacy is largely 
based on perceptions of commercial certainty and an impressive speed for 
processing claims.  International concerns are generally not directed towards 
the rights of individual Singaporeans, and when they are, they do not see the 
judiciary as holding international legitimacy, but as embodying empty 
legalism.61 
After colonial and then emergency beginnings amidst fears of 
communist insurgencies, the power of Singapore’s executive was gained at 
the expense of these rights—a regime of exception.  Executive power was 
removed from criticism and justified in the name of national unity and 
public order,62 whilst rudimentary civil and political constitutional rights 
                                           
55
  Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Pub. Prosecutor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 662, 684 (1994). 
56
  Tan, supra note 44, at 14. 
57
  Cf. Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur & Ors, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 542, 545 (1996) (concluding that “[a]n 
independent and impartial judiciary is a fundamental pillar of our society ….”). 
58
  See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Corporatism and Judicial Independence within Statist Legal Institutions 
in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 170, 
181 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).  
59
  Id. at 182. 
60
  See, e.g., Tan, supra note 44, at 15.  
61
  See, e.g., The Decline of the Rule of Law in Malaysia and Singapore Part II—Singapore, A Report 
of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 46 
RECORD 5, 17 (1991); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE REPORT, 




  See CHRISTOPHER TREMEWAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN SINGAPORE 204-
06 (1994). 
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were suspended.63  However, this exception has become the norm, as there 
has never been a return to a state of normalcy.64  Executive institutions 
remain insulated from any political criticism or scrutiny.65  Using the courts 
and the defamation and contempt laws they enforce to silence opposition 
through standard civil and criminal proceedings, rather than, for example, 
the Internal Security Act (Cap. 143), has normalized this exception.66  The 
law itself strengthens political rule, and legitimizes a rule by law, not a rule 
of law.67  An emphasis is placed on public order,68 even if this means pre-
empting disruption.69  
III. CHILLING POLITICAL OPPOSITION  
A. Freedom of Speech 
Such preemption of disruption is evident in the development of 
Singapore’s defamation laws.  In shielding the articulation of public critique 
of the government, Singapore’s defamation laws are strongly linked to ideas 
of Singaporean exceptionalism and the role of law in nation building.  
Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution provides every citizen with the right to 
freedom of speech and expression.  However, this right is qualified by the 
power given to Parliament to impose necessary or expedient restrictions in 
the interest of the security and public morality of Singapore, including 
restrictions against defamation.70  The interpretation of this qualification,71 
and enacted legislation,72 has led to description of the article as “the most 
circumscribed in the Constitution.”73  It has even been suggested that these 
restrictions have led to Singaporeans being cautious to publicly express non-
                                           
63
  See Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Exception Becomes the Norm: Law and Regimes of Exception in 
East Asia, 2(1) ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 108, 109 (2001). 
64
  Id. at 110. 
65
  Id. at 114.  
66
  See also FRANCIS T. SEOW, THE MEDIA ENTHRALLED: SINGAPORE REVISITED (1998).  
67
  See Jayasuriya, supra note 63, at 113. 
68
  Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Pub. Prosecutor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 662, 688 (1994). 
69
  Id. See also Li-Ann Thio, The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from 
Colin Chan v. Pub. Prosecutor, 16 SINGAPORE L. REV. 26, 88 (1995). See also Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, 
Harmony as Ideology, Culture and Control: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Singapore, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. 
OF ASIAN L. 120 (2007). 
70
  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE art. 14(2)(a). 
71
  See, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew v. J.B. Jeyaretnam, 1 Malayan L. J. 281 (1979); Jeyaretnam J.B. v. Lee 
Kuan Yew, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 310 (1992); Lee Kuan Yew & Anor v. Vinocur & Ors, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 477 
(1995). 
72
  See, e.g., Defamation Act, ch. 75 (1965) (Sing.); Penal Code, ch. 224 (1872) (Sing.); Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322 (1970) (Sing.) § 8; Official Secrets Act, ch. 213 (1935) (Sing.). 
73
  See Walter Woon, Singapore, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 314, 321 (Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997). 
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official views.74  The judiciary has recognized that the right to freedom of 
speech cannot be absolute.75  Much like the circulation of foreign 
publications, freedom of speech is seen as a privilege rather than a right.76  
By example, police must sanction all public gatherings in Singapore, unless 
the event is being held under the auspices of the government.77 
In Singapore’s jurisprudence of political defamation,78 there has been 
judicial acceptance of executive policy that freedom of speech must end 
where individual rights begin; that criticisms of public officials in respect of 
their official conduct must respect the bounds set by the law of defamation.79  
This approach does not define where individual rights begin, and in this 
respect short-circuits the constitutional balancing exercise with which the 
courts are entrusted.80  While vehement attacks may be leveled against 
public officials, they must not infringe on the right for protection of 
reputation.81  As the extent of protection is not defined, it is afforded at the 
expense of individual rights.  In this way, defamation laws protect the 
executive from criticism in a manner that reflects the statist nature of 
Singapore’s courts. 
Political defamation jurisprudence in Singapore is different from other 
common law jurisdictions.  Whereas in many other common law 
jurisdictions, any injury caused to reputation is a necessary sacrifice for 
politicians, false speech itself does not gain protection under the democratic 
rationale.82  Nonetheless, in those jurisdictions, the idea that entering public 
                                           
74
  Id. at 321-22.  
75
  See, e.g., Attorney General v. Lingle & Ors, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 696, 701 (1995) (concluding that 
allegations made against the judiciary “under the guise of freedom of speech and expression” were held to 
undermine public confidence in the administration of justice).  
76
  See James Gomez, Free Speech and Opposition Parties in Singapore, 5 ASIA RTS. J. 1, 3 (2005).  
77
  Public Entertainments and Meetings Act, ch. 257 (1959) (Sing.) § 3.  
78
  See also Tsun Hang Tey, Singapore’s Jurisprudence of Political Defamation and its Triple-
Whammy Impact on Political Speech, PUBLIC L. REV. 452 (2008).  
79
  See, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, 1 Malayan L. J. 281 (1979); Jeyaretnam 
Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, 2 Malayan L. J. 282 (1979); Goh Chok Tong v. Jeyaretnam Joshua 
Benjamin & Anor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 337 (1998). See also Michael Hor, The Freedom of Speech and 
Defamation: Jeyaratnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, SINGAPORE J.  OF LEGAL STUD. 542 (1992). 
80
  See Michael Hor & C.S.L. Seah, Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and Expression in 
Singapore, 12 SINGAPORE  L. REV. 296, 312 (1991). 
81
  Jeyaretnam J.B. v. Lee Kuan Yew, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 310, 332H-I, 333A (1992) (concluding that 
“politicians … are equally entitled to have their reputations protected as those of any other persons … the 
publication of false and defamatory allegations, even in the absence of actual malice on the part of the 
publisher, should [not] be allowed to pass with impunity.”). 
82
  In England, it has been held to be contrary to public interest for a government body to have 
standing in a defamation action because of the importance of government bodies being open to uninhibited 
public criticism.  See Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534 (U.K).  A 
cogent summary was provided by Lord Bridge of the Privy Council accurately describing the balance of the 
position of politicians in English-speaking democracies, including Australia and New Zealand: “In a free 
democratic society it is almost too obvious to need stating that those who hold office in government and 
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life includes an assumption of risk of public scrutiny prevails.83  For 
example, under the public figure doctrine of the United States, a public 
official can only recover damages for defamation where the defendant had 
actual malice, which is a high threshold to meet.84  Singapore’s courts have 
openly rejected the public figure doctrine under U.S. law,85 and instead have 
turned the doctrine inside-out by awarding higher damages to public figures, 
rather than private citizens, in defamation actions.86  In Singapore, the rights 
of those in power are preferred, as persons in public positions of great 
responsibility and trust are felt to be more vulnerable.  According to Goh 
Joon Seng, J., “[t]he greater the reputation of the person defamed, the greater 
the damage award that will be made—on the basis that these persons are 
vulnerable in so far as they are well known … and have a wider circle of 
social and business contacts.”87  On this view, the best people must be 
attracted to serve the Singaporean leadership without fear of damage to their 
reputations.88  
This divergent approach taken by the judiciary to freedom of speech is 
similar to other freedoms, such as the right to freedom of religion,89 which 
can be circumscribed if its exercise is prejudicial to the common good.90  
Singapore’s courts only place selective use upon foreign precedents, and 
reject foreign precedents in relation to defenses for defamation.  The 
“Singaporeanisation” of English defamation laws is consistent with the 
judiciary’s general approach to adjudication.  After appeals to the Privy 
Council were abolished in 1994,91 there has been a surge in developing “a 
body of autochthonous case law,”92 which must reflect the fundamental 
                                                                                                                              
who are responsible for public administration must always be open to criticism. Any attempt to stifle or 
fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable kind.”  See 
Hector v. Att’y-Gen. of Antigua & Barbuda, [1990] 2 All E.R. 103, 106 (U.K).  The position in EU law 
should also be noted.  See Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 419 (1986) (concluding that “[t]he limits 
of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private 
individual.  Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his 
every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater 
degree of tolerance.”). 
83
  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 173-4 (1981). 
84
  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
85
  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 97 (1998). 
86
  See Tey Tsun Hang, Inducing a Constructive Press in Singapore: Responsibility Over Freedom, 
10 AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 202, 217 (2008). 
87
  Lee Kuan Yew & Anor v. Vinocur & Ors, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 477, 485-6 (1995) (quoting KEITH R. 
EVANS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 104-05 (2d ed. 1993). 
88
  See also Tan, supra note 25, at 106-8. 
89
  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE art. 15. 
90
  Nappalli Peter Williams v. Inst. of Technical Educ., 2 Sing. L. Rep. 569, 576 (1999).  
91
  See also Application of English Law Act, ch. 7A (1993) (Sing.). 
92
  1994 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 689 (1994) (concluding that “[t]he 
development of our law should reflect these changes and the fundamental values of Singapore society.”).  
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values of Singaporean society.93  This autochthonous jurisprudence accepts 
parliamentary ascendancy and a positivist interpretation of constitutional 
provisions,94 to the extent that constitutional interpretation in Singapore is 
now to come primarily “from within its own four walls and not in the light 
of analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the United 
States of America or Australia.”95  One explanation for this approach is that 
there are felt to be “conditions unique to Singapore” such as its “small 
geographical size;”96 yet there remains selective acceptance of precedents 
from other common law jurisdictions.  Whilst this has been felt to imply that 
Singapore’s courts have embraced cultural relativism, even if deviating from 
common law norms,97 it must be said that this approach augments 
uncertainty in Singaporean law.  It is by no means clear as to when “unique 
conditions” might lead to Singapore’s law diverging from precedents 
currently based on broad common law principles.   At present this 
divergence is apparent in laws concerning individual rights and freedoms, 
including defamation proceedings.  
In Singapore, it has been argued that the value of free speech, in 
particular for opposition politicians, is limited through the pressure created 
by these defamation laws.  This is felt to be compounded by an alleged fear 
it instills in local media not to disseminate opposition comments.98  Despite 
these concerns, Singapore’s judiciary feels there is a need to protect the 
government’s reputation and to defend stability and order, even if this means 
providing new grounds for executive power.99  In Lee Kuan Yew v. 
Vinocur,100 Goh, J. held that an accusation against three ministers of 
government of corruption and nepotism “was an attack on the very core of 
their political credo [and] would undermine their ability to govern.”101  
                                                                                                                              
This development had already included the introduction of the Singapore Law Reports in 1992.  It has 
continued with the launch of Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore in 1999, and of the Singapore Academy of Law 
Annual Review of Singapore Cases in 1999. 
93
  Id. 
94
  Jabar bin Kadermastan v. Pub. Prosecutor, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 617, 631 (1995).  
95
  Nappalli Peter Williams v. Inst. of Technical Educ., 2 Sing. L. Rep. 569, 574 (1999). See 
generally Li-Ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations—
Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 428 (2005-2006). 
96
  Att’y-Gen. v. Hertzberg Daniel, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 1103, 1125 (2009). 
97
  See Tan, supra note 44, at 7. 
98
  See Gomez, supra note 76. See also INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTE REPORT, PROSPERITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW IN SINGAPORE (2008), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=93326691-c4da-473b-943a-dd0fc76325e8. 
99
  See Jayasuriya, supra note 63, at 115. 
100
  Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 491 (1995). 
101
  Id. 
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Singapore’s judiciary feels there is a need to afford protection to the 
executive in the hope that it will assist the day-to-day functioning of the 
executive.  Indeed, Chua, J. elucidated precisely this view in Lee Kuan Yew 
v. Seow Khee Leng.102  There, his Honor held that “[m]oral authority is the 
cornerstone of effective government.  If this moral authority is eroded, the 
government cannot function.”103  It is in the context of this statism and 
protection afforded to the executive within which Singapore’s courts 
operate. 
B. Defamation and Contempt  
The government’s use of defamation cases in Singapore might lead to 
the perception that their use silences political opposition.  Lee Kuan Yew 
argues that if he does not launch defamation actions on allegations made 
against him, the claims will be seen as true.104  Those who allege his 
defamation actions are designed to silence the opposition “do not understand 
how readily an allegation of dishonesty or corruption would be believed in a 
region where corruption, cronyism, and nepotism are still a plague.”105  Lee 
Kuan Yew sees it as his duty to preserve a climate of confidence and 
discipline, “without which Singapore will wither away and die.”106  Recent 
cases involving the NKF scandal,107 the opposition, and foreign publications 
are illustrative of the proposition that this use of defamation suits leads to a 
chilling effect on the freedom of speech and political opposition in 
Singapore,108 or more figuratively, “the Singapore Chill,” whereby the risks 
of legal liability deter Singaporeans and others from making socially 
valuable comments and instead maintain their silence.109 
                                           
102
  Lee Kuan Yew v. Seow Khee Leng, 1 Malayan L. J. 172 (1989).  
103
  Id. at 176 (emphasis added).  
104
  See HAN, FERNANDEZ, & TAN, supra note 27, at 222 (citing Interview by British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore (June 14, 
1995)); see also Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 1, at 130. 
105
  Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 1, at 131. 
106
  See Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech to PAP MPs After 
the Anson By-Election Loss (Nov. 17, 1981) in JAMES MINCHIN, NO MAN IS AN ISLAND: A PORTRAIT OF 
SINGAPORE’S LEE KUAN YEW 199 (2d ed. 1990). 
107
  See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
108
  See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
109
  For a useful discussion of the concept of chilling speech, see Andrew Kenyon, Investigating 
Chilling Effects: News Media and Public Speech in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, 4 INT’L J. OF 
COMMC’N 440, 442 (2010). 
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1. Opposition Politicians  
a) Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party 
In Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, Lee Kuan Yew 
and Lee Hsien Loong sued the Singapore Democratic Party (“SDP”), its 
secretary-general, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, and a member of its Central 
Executive Committee, Ms. Chee Siok Chin, for defamation in respect of two 
articles and a photograph concerning the NKF scandal published in The New 
Democrat, the SDP’s own newspaper.  The following words were inter alia 
the subject of dispute:110 
 
It is impossible not to notice the striking resemblance between 
how the NKF operated and how the PAP runs Singapore … 
Singaporeans must note that the NKF is not an aberration of the 
PAP system. It is, instead, a product of it. … With the PAP 
monopolizing power and making sure that no one has the 
means to challenge that hold on power … are we not witnessing 
the NKF but on a larger and national scale? 
 
Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, 
which is possible because the courts of Singapore have assumed jurisdiction 
to award summary judgments in defamation cases.111  In this case, her Honor 
held that the disputed words and photograph constituted defamation by 
implication.112  In congruence with the consistency of the success of Lee 
Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong in defamation actions,113 the Court of 
Appeal dismissed an appeal against this decision.114 
According to Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. the “sting” in the disputed 
words was that they highlighted commonalities between the government and 
the NKF, namely, “lack of transparency and lack of accountability,” and 
implied “that the PAP and the political elite are not transparent about the 
finances of the Government … because they want to conceal their financial 
improprieties.”115  They implied that Lee Kuan Yew had set up “a corrupt 
political system for the benefit of the political elite … ;”116 that Lee Hsien 
                                           
110
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 684-5 (2007). 
111
  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. SM Summit Holdings Ltd., 4 Sing. L. Rep. 529 (1999). 
112
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 700 (2007). 
113
  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
114
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 757 (2008). 
115
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 701 (2007). 
116
  Id. at 702. 
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Loong had perpetuated this corrupt system,117 and that both men were 
dishonest and unfit for office.118  Another “sting” was felt to be that Lee 
Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew brought defamation actions “not to 
vindicate their reputations but to suppress allegations which were true and 
which they knew to be true,” which “has led to a situation where wrong-
doings cannot be exposed.”119 
The court dismissed all defenses, but in so doing adopted an 
overwhelmingly black letter law approach by omitting to pay due regard to 
all relevant circumstances.  Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. dismissed the defense 
of justification on the basis that the matter was in the public interest for a 
lack of particulars;120 similarly, her Honor held that the defense of fair 
comment was lacking in particulars and was full of generalizations and 
vagueness which were “symptomatic of a sham defence.”121  Despite these 
strong words, the judgment did not subject these first two defenses to 
lengthy analysis.  Finally, her Honor dismissed the defense of qualified 
privilege.122  Her Honor mentioned the position in other common law 
jurisdictions, but ultimately concluded that these positions were 
“inconsistent” with Singapore’s defamation laws;123 in other words, cultural 
relativism precluded their application.  Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. encountered 
no difficulties whatsoever in finding in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The defendants, as members of an opposition political party, argued 
they had a duty to publish their views as a matter of public interest.124  This 
position is similar to one advanced by Associate Professor Tsun Hang Tey of 
the National University of Singapore, who has argued that current 
defamation laws in Singapore cause a serious imbalance between society’s 
interests in political speech and individual reputation, and are “seriously 
discouraging” of criticism of government policies.125  However, Belinda Ang 
Saw Ean, J. stated that the defendant’s argument was a “distortion,” and 
“[t]he mere fact that a publication relates to ‘political information’ or 
‘matters of serious public concern’ does not entail that qualified privilege 
therefore attaches to its dissemination to the world at large.”126  Regardless 
of her Honor’s intentions, dismissing not unmeritorious defenses in such an 
                                           
117
  Id. 
118
  Id. 
119
  Id. at 703. 
120
  Id. at 704-5. 
121
  Id. at 705. 
122
  Id. at 705-9.  
123
  Id. at 709. 
124
  Id. at 705. 
125
  Tey, supra note 78, at 461.  
126
  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep 675, 706 (2007). 
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inflexible manner silences criticisms of the government made by opposition 
politicians and weakens opposition in Singaporean politics. 
Whilst no defense to defamation has ever been successful against a 
government politician, it is clear that defenses are available for application 
in Singapore courts.127  In Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong,128 a defense of fair 
comment was made out by the Minister for Defense against Singapore’s 
iconic opposition figure of the time.  Whilst defamatory words imputing 
dishonorable conduct or a lack of integrity were proven, the courts held that 
a fair-minded person could have honestly arrived at the same conclusion.129  
Regardless of whether the conclusion was biased, prejudiced, or grossly 
exaggerated, it fell within the limit of fair comment.130  This highlights that 
the current state of the law discourages the opposition from commenting on 
government policy whilst affording protection to the executive.  This state of 
affairs is exacerbated by the fact that public protests have been stopped 
through public order regulations;131 the circulation of domestic and foreign 
newspapers is regulated and has been reduced,132 ensuring PAP control of 
print media;133 and fines have been introduced for delivering a political 
speech without a permit.134  As Singapore has not ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these restrictions are easily 
enforceable. 
b) Related Contempt Proceedings 
Apart from defamation laws, the right of freedom of speech and 
expression guaranteed by the Constitution is also subject to the law 
                                           
127
  Workers Party v. Tay Boon Too, Sing. L. Rep. 621 (1972-74).  
128
  Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong, 1 Malayan L. J. 334 (1985), aff’d, Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong 
Sing. L. Rep. 106 (1986), aff’d, Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong, Sing. L. Rep. 4 (1989).  
129
  Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong, 1 Malayan L. J. 334, 340-41 (1985). 
130
  Id. at 341. 
131
  This included: an amendment to § 4 of the Societies Act in 1988 to permit deregistration of any 
society that made political statement beyond its stated mandate; further, the passing of the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act, ch. 167A (1992) (Sing.), which prohibits religious groups from conducting 
political activities that are disguised as religious; and amendments to the Films Act, ch. 107 (1981) (Sing.), 
to ban political advertising using film-related mechanisms (§ 33).  See also the Undesirable Publications 
Act, ch. 338 (1967) (Sing.). 
132
  The Newspapers and Printing Presses Act, ch. 206 (1975) (Sing.) was amended in 1974 to give the 
Minister discretionary powers to deem if foreign publications were interfering in Singapore’s domestic 
politics. This can be done through the publication of an order in the Gazette, which leads to the restriction 
of its circulation (§ 24).  
133
  This culminated in the 1984 merger of The Straits Times group and Singapore News and 
Publications Ltd. into Singapore Press Holdings—which is presided over by a former PAP cabinet minister 
and has been previously headed by former internal security chiefs S.R. Nathan and Tjung Yuk Min.  
134
  Public Entertainments and Meetings Act, ch. 257 (1959) (Sing.) § 3 (a police permit is required to 
hold a public talk or to deliver a political speech). 
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concerning contempt of court.135  The legislature has granted the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal the power to punish any individual for contempt of 
court,136 which includes any comment which scandalizes the court or 
damages the credibility of the judiciary’s independence.137  Whilst 
Singapore’s government has stated that it does not intend to inhibit the 
interchange of views on matters of public interest, it has made clear that any 
deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the courts “by casting 
aspersions on the integrity of the judges in order to further a political or 
ideological agenda” will be met with contempt proceedings,138 yet feels that 
“[t]his principle is also accepted in other democratic societies”.139 However, 
legal precedent in other democratic common law countries is premised on 
the assumption that democratic societies have functioning oppositions. 
Therefore contempt proceedings instituted in Singapore must be viewed 
against this different background. 
(1) Singapore Democratic Party 
Subsequent to the defamation proceedings, Dr. Chee Soon Juan and 
Ms. Chee Siok Chin were also found guilty of contempt of court for their 
behavior during the case and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.140  
Questions asked and comments made by the defendants in their cross-
examinations and oral submissions were felt to constitute “outrageous 
behaviour,”141 and “in a small country like Singapore,” felt to undermine 
public confidence in the judiciary and impair and bring into disrepute the 
administration of justice.142  Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. felt that, “under the 
guise of cross-examination,” the defendants used the hearing “as an occasion 
to indict a political regime, publicise their personal and political agenda as 
well as stir up political controversy,”143 an objective which perpetuated “the 
myth of a defence.”144  
Her Honor seemed outraged that the defendants suggested in her 
courtroom that in defamation cases involving the government, the PAP “will 
interfere with the judicial process so as to procure a favourable verdict,” 
                                           
135
  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE art. 14(2)(a). 
136
  Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322 (1970) (Sing.). 
137
  Att’y-Gen. v. Chee Soon Juan, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 650 (2006).  
138




  Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. R. 642 (2009). 
141
  Id. at 723. 
142
  Id. at 729. 
143
  Id. at 724. 
144
  Id. 
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and/or that the judge will “decide the case in a way that will please or curry 
favour with the PAP.”145  These arguments advanced by the defendants 
embodied a direct attack on the PAP’s ideological platform, one which the 
judiciary strives to uphold.146 Taken as a whole, Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J.’s 
comments seemed to suggest that the defendants had broken an unwritten 
rule to subordinate themselves as citizens to the deference of their leaders, 
and that such a breach would not go unpunished. 
For Dr. Chee Soon Juan, this was his second sentence for contempt 
imposed in less than two years.  In Attorney-General v. Chee Soon Juan,147 
Dr. Chee Soon Juan was held in contempt for alleging that the judiciary 
acted at the instance of the government in cases involving opposition 
politicians, and insinuating that judges were removed from office if they 
were perceived as lenient towards opposition politicians.148  This statement 
was made at the hearing of a bankruptcy petition against him.  In 2001, Dr. 
Chee Soon Juan could not find local representation to defend defamation 
suits he was facing against Lee Kuan Yew and then Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong, and was thrice denied permission for representation by a foreign 
lawyer.149  Eventually, summary judgment against Dr. Chee Soon Juan was 
granted.150  In subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, instituted against him for 
failure to pay damages awarded in the summary judgment, Dr. Chee Soon 
Juan was again unable to find representation, and a judicial declaration of 
bankruptcy blocked his right to contest the 2006 General Election.151  On the 
basis of such analogies, it has been argued defamation suits are exploited to 
silence and eliminate members of the opposition through the twin swords of 
bankruptcy and defamation law.152  In light of the restrictions on political 
speeches and protest in Singapore,153 it is not startling that opposition 
politicians might attempt to use the sanctum of the courtroom to voice their 
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  Id. at 727. 
146
  See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text. 
147
  Att’y-Gen. v. Chee Soon Juan, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 650 (2006). 
148
  Id.  A similar argument has been advanced by the International Bar Association. See 
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE REPORT, PROSPERITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS? HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN SINGAPORE 49-61 (2008), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=93326691-c4da-473b-943a-dd0fc76325e8.  
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  Re Littlemore Stuart Q.C., 1 Sing. L. Rep. 296 (2002); Re Nicholas William Henric Q.C., 2 Sing. 
L. Rep. 296 (2002); Re Lee Chu Ming Martin Q.C., 4 Sing. L. Rep. 929 (2002).  
150
  Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 8 (2003); Goh Chok Tong v. Chee Soon Juan, 
3 Sing. L. Rep. 32 (2003). 
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  See also Hang, supra note 86, at 215-16. 
152
  See KELLY BRYAN & HOWARD RUBIN, LAWYERS’ RIGHTS WATCH CANADA, MISUSE OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN SINGAPORE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MATTER OF RE JOSHUA BENJAMIN JEYARETNAM, 
EX PARTE INDRA KRISHNAN (2004), 
http://www.lrwc.org/documents/Misuse%20of%20Bankruptcy%20Law.Bryan&Rubin.22.10.04.pdf. 
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  See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. 
MARCH 2011 THE SINGAPORE CHILL 337 
  
political concerns, however it is clear that the judiciary will not provide any 
such sanctuary. 
(2) Kangaroo Court Allegations 
At the hearing for the assessment of damages for Lee Hsien Loong v. 
Singapore Democratic Party held in May 2008,154 three men appeared in the 
Supreme Court wearing t-shirts each imprinted with a picture of a kangaroo 
dressed in a judge’s gown.  One of the men pointed to his t-shirt and said 
“this is a kangaroo court” to Lee Kuan Yew as he walked past him outside 
the court in which the damages hearing was proceeding.  All three men were 
later found in contempt of court for stigmatizing that the Singapore judiciary 
operates in a kangaroo court.155  
Judith Prakash, J. found that this “amounted to a deliberate and 
provocative attack,”156 which was “intended to cast aspersions on the way in 
which the assessment of damages hearing was being conducted,”157 as well 
as on the justice system in general.158  All three men were sentenced to terms 
of imprisonment.  The explicit message conveyed in this case is that the 
Singaporean judiciary will not allow itself to be implicated in accusations of 
bias.  Combined with the use of defamation proceedings, the precedent for 
opposition politicians in Singapore is that they must only cautiously express 
their public views lest they be found guilty of defamation or contempt of 
court.  
2. Foreign Publications 
a) Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong 
In Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong,159 the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, a Hong Kong based English language Asian news 
magazine, was found to have published an article defamatory of both the 
former and current Prime Ministers.  The article was largely based on 
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criticisms of the government leveled against it by Dr. Chee Soon Juan, 
including in respect of the NKF scandal, and comments on the defamation 
actions he was facing at the time.  Unlike some foreign publications faced 
with defamation actions, the Far Eastern Economic Review was not willing 
to settle.160  Instead, the Far Eastern Economic Review sought to exert 
pressure on the government to allow for greater criticism, and to argue that 
Lee Kuan Yew’s use of defamation suits are an impediment to a pluralist and 
fully democratic Singapore.161  The following words in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review’s article were inter alia the subject of dispute:162  
 
[The NKF corruption scandal] raises the question of whether 
Singapore deserves its reputation for squeaky-clean government 
… . The government … openly uses the funds for refurbishing 
apartment blocks as a bribe for districts that vote for the ruling 
party.163 Singaporeans have no way of knowing whether 
officials are abusing their trust … Singaporean officials have a 
remarkable record of success in winning libel suits against their 
critics. The question then is, how many other libel suits have 
Singapore’s great and good wrongly won, resulting in the 
cover-up of real misdeeds? And are libel suits deliberately used 
as a tool to suppress questioning voices? 
 
The defendants stated that these and other words meant that Lee Kuan Yew 
has persecuted political opponents under unaltered and antiquated 
defamation laws that favor political plaintiffs.164  However, the defendants 
denied that these words implicated Lee Hsien Loong in any manner, except 
to the extent that they presented him “as a victim of his father’s culture of 
non-transparency.”165  In summary judgment, Woo Bih Li, J. found against 
the defendants.166  His Honor reiterated that there was no need for a trial to 
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take place.167  Both defendants suggested that there ought to be a trial to do 
justice to them, because of the stature of the plaintiffs; but his Honor said 
that allowing this to occur would place foreign defendants in a more 
favorable position than local defendants.168  This is a curious position, given 
the positions of power held by the plaintiffs as Prime Minister and Minister 
Mentor. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision at first instance, and found 
that the natural and ordinary meaning of these words was that Lee Kuan Yew 
and Lee Hsien Loong are corrupt; have been running and continue to run 
Singapore in the same corrupt manner as the NKF was run; and have been 
using libel actions to cover up their misdeeds.169  To be sure, these 
allegations of corruption strike at the heart of Singapore’s ideological 
platform as a corruption-free meritocracy with an independent judiciary. 
As in Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party,170 the court 
rejected all defenses raised, in a manner imbued with black letter law and 
insufficient regard to all relevant circumstances, as well as a selective 
application of common law precedent.  The defense of justification was held 
inapplicable, because it was found that the disputed words bore the meaning 
pleaded by the plaintiffs, and the defendants had not pleaded justification in 
relation to that meaning.171  The defense of fair comment was rejected on the 
basis that the defense only applies to comments and not imputations of facts, 
and here there were not found to be any supporting facts behind the 
allegations of corruption.172  The defense of derivative qualified privilege, 
under which the defendants argued that Dr. Chee Soon Juan was entitled to 
repel accusations made against him by Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew, 
also failed on the grounds that “the law does not allow a free-for-all tit for 
tat,” and that a “retaliatory attack” by Dr. Chee Soon Juan on Lee Hsien 
Loong and Lee Kuan Yew was “wholly unnecessary” for the purposes of 
defending his own reputation.173  This finding was made despite the fact that 
Dr. Chee Soon Juan is subject to constant attacks by the most powerful men 
in the island state. 
The Court of Appeal, in a stunning performance of common law 
legitimacy, considered at length the defense of qualified privilege and the 
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approach taken in other jurisdictions.174  This spanned frequently considered 
jurisdictions such as England,175 Australia,176 New Zealand,177 and 
Canada,178 but also included an assortment of other jurisdictions such as 
Hong Kong,179 Malaysia,180 Jamaica,181 South Africa,182 Ireland,183 and 
Samoa.184  Whilst undertaking any such review might be seen to be 
inconsistent with the idea of Singaporeanising common law precedent,185 the 
court seemed to suggest that the review of these jurisdictions revealed there 
is no such common law precedent in relation to the defense of qualified 
privilege.  Instead, courts in these jurisdictions have demonstrated there is a 
need to decide how to strike an appropriate balance between the 
“competing” interests of freedom of speech and protection of reputation in 
the context of local conditions.186  The court found that there existed three 
approaches to striking this balance.187  First, a “preferential right” approach, 
where freedom of speech is preferenced over protection of reputation if it is 
reasonable and relates to government and political matters.188  Second, a 
“fundamental right” approach, where freedom of speech trumps protection 
of reputation, unless the defamatory statement was published with malice.189  
Third, a “co-equal rights” approach, where neither freedom of speech nor 
protection of reputation takes precedence over the other.190  It is notable that 
under none of the three approaches was protection of reputation preferred 
over freedom of speech. 
However, the court found that, in this instance, because the defendants 
were not citizens of Singapore, they were not entitled to enjoy constitutional 
free speech, and so there was no need to decide what approach the courts 
should adopt to the interpretation of such freedom.191  Nonetheless, the court 
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outlined in dicta some interesting considerations it thought pertinent in 
deciding the limits of constitutional free speech in Singapore.192  The court 
suggested that Singapore has no place in its political culture for the making 
of “false defamatory statements which damage the reputation of a person 
(especially a holder of public office) for the purposes of scoring political 
points,”193 because of the “heavy emphasis” placed in Singapore’s culture on 
“honesty and integrity in public discourse on matters of public interest.”194  
The court felt that it was “one thing to falsely claim that an UFO has been 
spotted over the skies of Singapore,” and “quite another to falsely assert that 
a person is a crook or a charlatan, especially if that person is also a holder of 
public office.”195  This hyperbolized dictum reveals a judicial unwillingness 
to change the direction of Singapore’s jurisprudence of political defamation 
and instead to maintain the protection afforded to the executive by the 
judiciary. 
The court ventured to make some astounding comments that there is 
no evidence that Singapore’s circumstances have changed significantly since 
the founding of the island state, which it will be recalled took place in a 
climate of fear and instability.  The court held that the balance struck on 
September 16, 1963, the day freedom of speech became a constitutional 
right in Singapore, between constitutional free speech and protection of 
reputation is still “appropriate in the prevailing circumstances in Singapore 
today.”196  The court felt that “[p]roponents of change must produce 
evidence of a change in [Singapore’s] political, social and cultural values in 
order to satisfy the court that change is necessary … .”197  In so stating, the 
court demonstrated how the exception truly has become the norm.198  By 
implication, the judiciary appears to accept that it has normalized the PAP’s 
exceptionalist platform and has no intent of renormalizing the regime of 
exception to reflect the position in which Singapore now finds itself in the 
21st century.  It is doubtful whether defendants would be able to demonstrate 
such change has occurred, without mitigating the risk of falling foul of both 
the executive and the judiciary. 
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(1) Risk of Restriction of Circulation of Publications  
Lee Kuan Yew demands that the media operate in Singapore to 
reinforce and not to undermine the cultural values and social attitudes of the 
government.199  On this view, freedom of the press must be subordinated to 
the need to sustain the integrity of Singapore.  The government will take 
“firm measures” to ensure that unity of purpose in Singapore remains.200  
For example, the Media Development Authority of Singapore Act (Cap. 172) 
is not merely regulatory in nature; it criminalizes certain acts or 
omissions.201  According to Lee Kuan Yew, foreign publications must not 
assume a role in Singapore of “invigilator, adversary, and inquisitor of the 
administration,” as Singaporean society is not perceived as strong enough to 
withstand such treatment.202  
Foreign publications require a permit to circulate in Singapore, and 
the Minister of Information, Communication and the Arts may give or refuse 
approval of the distribution of a foreign publication in Singapore without 
assigning any reasons.203  It is seen as a privilege and not a right for this 
circulation, and restrictions have been imposed on other large-scale 
publications.204  To underline how serious the government is about keeping 
the foreign media under check, a ban was imposed on the Far Eastern 
Economic Review’s distribution following publication of the article and the 
Far Eastern Economic Review’s refusal to comply with new conditions 
imposed.205  Thus, there appears to be no commercial certainty (apart from 
the PAP line) for foreign media enterprises operating in Singapore, and their 
commercial rights to bring foreign capital into the Singaporean economy are 
not upheld. Notably, this lack of commercial certainty is also inconsistent 
with the government’s economic agenda of encouraging international 
investment. 
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b) Related Contempt Proceedings 
The judiciary has also shown that it too will take firm measures to 
ensure that its decisions are not brought into contempt by foreign media.  In 
Attorney-General v. Hertzberg Daniel,206 Dow Jones Publishing Company 
(Asia) Inc., the proprietor and publisher of the Wall Street Journal Asia, and 
sister publication of the Far Eastern Economic Review, was found in 
contempt of court.  The contempt related to two articles and a letter by Dr. 
Chee Soon Juan published in the Wall Street Journal Asia.  Their content 
largely related to the circumstances considered in both Lee Hsien Loong v. 
Singapore Democratic Party and Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien 
Loong.  Dow Jones had already been found guilty of contempt of court on 
two previous occasions.207 
The court found that all three publications “contained insinuations of 
bias, lack of impartiality and lack of independence and implied that the 
judiciary is subservient to Mr. Lee and/or the PAP and is a tool for silencing 
political dissent.”208  The most recent article was found to imply that the 
suppression of political dissent is achieved by way of damages awarded by 
the courts in defamation suits; that the judiciary is a tool to muzzle political 
dissent and lacks impartiality and independence where opposition politicians 
are concerned; and that everything in Singapore, including the judiciary, is 
controlled by Lee Kuan Yew.209  
Tay Yong Kwang, J. appeared overwhelmingly unimpressed by these 
claims.  His Honor was especially unenthusiastic with their implications that 
“the price of political dissent equals the monetary damages payable in 
defamation actions commenced by Mr. Lee and his son,”210 and that judicial 
bias towards Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong “assists them in the 
suppression of political dissent among opposition politicians” through these 
damages.211  The article was found to imply that defamation cases are not 
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decided based on their merits, “but for the ulterior purpose of penalising 
political dissent.”212 
Finally, his Honor was particularly scathing about reference in one 
article to a recent report of the International Bar Association.  This report, 
eponymously entitled “Prosperity Versus Individual Rights,” was damning in 
its assessment of defamation actions.  The report concluded that Singapore 
cannot claim that civil and political rights must be secondary to economic 
rights, as the island state now has a highly sophisticated and prosperous 
economy,213 and that “the slim likelihood” of a successful defense to 
defamation, combined with high damages awarded in cases involving PAP 
officials, “sheds doubt on the independence of the judiciary in these 
cases.”214  The offending article stated that “when the country is ready to 
join the ranks of modern democracies, the IBA’s recommendations provide a 
good checklist of how to do so.” 215  In his Honor’s view, this was nothing 
short of a “triumphalist note” and a “mocking stance,”216 insidiously 
insinuating through the need for reform of the court system that the judiciary 
“is not independent and impartial in cases involving the ruling party or its 
interests.”217  Notwithstanding these remarks, no charges or proceedings 
have been brought against the International Bar Association. 
In any event, here the court felt it needed to find contempt because of 
the serious nature of the allegations made.  The defense of fair criticism 
could not succeed in this context, as the offending publications attacked the 
impartiality of Singapore’s judiciary and did not contain reasonable 
argument or expostulation.218  Most notably, Tay Yong Kwang, J. felt that in 
Singapore, “impartiality and independence are the judiciary’s crucial 
cornerstones.  Putting these qualities into question destabilizes the edifice of 
the rule of law and, consequently, threatens to bring down [Singapore’s] 
reputation.”219  Therefore the publications could not be countenanced 
without punishment for contempt.  Damage to the reputation of Singapore 
would have ramifications for the executive’s task of nation building, and 
would allegedly damage stability and economic growth.  The precedent here 
is clear: Singapore’s courts will not tolerate press commentary which 
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undermines the judiciary and, by implication, the executive.  Moreover, 
when comments destabilize the edifice of the rule of law, creating potential 
to erode Singapore’s corruption-free reputation, the courts will defend the 
integrity of Singapore with vigor. 
c) Legal Representation 
Whilst Singapore’s judiciary may continue to defend Singapore’s 
reputation, it appears that some defendants will forego adequate legal 
representation in proceedings in Singapore’s courts.  Whilst there is not a 
lack of counsel who are adequately experienced or trained to litigate an 
issue, there is a lack of experienced counsel who are willing to take on 
politically-unpopular cases.  This is a prime example of the effect of a statist, 
thin rule of law on the functioning of Singapore’s legal system.  Denying 
adequate legal representation both quells dissent and further demonstrates 
the hollowness of the government’s cultural relativist claims.  In Review 
Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong, the Far Eastern Economic Review 
experienced denial of its chosen legal representation when the courts refused 
to allow representation by a British Queen’s Counsel in the defamation 
proceedings.220  The emphasis on communitarian legalism under a statist 
conception of the rule of law questions the value of a thin rule of law where 
defendants are not able to secure adequate representation.  In rejecting the 
Far Eastern Economic Review’s appeal against this decision, Tay Yong 
Kwang, J. said should FEER’s counsel (alleged to be inadequate and 
inexperienced) feel: 
 
he would be embroiled in a battle of ‘David and Goliath’ 
proportions, perhaps he could take comfort in the fact that the 
little shepherd boy armed with only a sling and stones emerged 
the victor against the gigantic seasoned soldier wearing a 
shield, a sword and a spear.221 
 
This dictum is astonishing on two levels (despite his Honor’s laodicean 
characterization of this issue as being “on a lighter note”).222  First, it is 
tantamount to an unequivocal recognition by his Honor that Singapore 
operates in an unfairly weighted adversarial system.  Second, this acceptance 
of Singapore’s adversarial system can be contrasted with the emphasis 
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placed on communitarian values by the judiciary, in line with Lee Kuan 
Yew’s emphasis on Asian and Confucian values.  
Imagery of a stereotypical courtroom battle is not assuaged by any 
emphasis on communitarianism, Confucianism, “Asianism” and similar 
constructs.  As a result of Confucian beliefs, it is said that Singaporeans view 
authorities not as adversarial but as an “extension of familiar rule,”223 with a 
cultural preference for dispute resolution mechanisms other than 
litigation.224  Even under this familiar rule, political reputations and 
defamation suits seem “unsusceptible to negotiation.”225  Communitarian 
legalism then becomes untenable, because defamation suits are meant to 
protect the community from instability in Singapore, but at the same time 
they emphasize the cultural norm of adversarialism said to be so foreign to 
Singapore.  His Honor’s statement either reveals a road-to-Damascus 
conversion on the conceptualization of the place of courts in Singaporean 
society, or more likely, a miscellany of arguments: cultural norms are only 
reverted to when congruent with PAP policy.  The value of the rule of law is 
lowered when the judiciary, so accepting of the PAP’s politics of exception, 
then undermines the cultural values they espouse and, moreover, their 
allegedly autochthonous jurisprudence, hitherto seen as so pivotal because of 
conditions supposedly unique to Singapore.  Finally, the fact remains that 
despite Tay Yong Kwang, J.’s reassurances that the litigation might be a 
David-and-Goliath battle, in Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publishing Co. Ltd., 
the “gigantic seasoned soldier” emerged the victor by way of summary 
judgment: it will be recalled that no battle took place in the form of a trial. 
As a result of this adversarial system, the issue of representation under 
the rule of law is brought into question.226  Especially for the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, if as according to Tay Yong Kwang, J. the case was going 
to be so adversarial, a “slingshot” was never going to be sufficient to create a 
watershed in Singapore’s legal history and persuade the judiciary to abandon 
its literalist approach to constitutional interpretation.  It will also be recalled 
that Dr. Chee Soon Juan could not find local representation to defend 
defamation suits he was facing from Lee Kuan Yew and then Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong and was denied permission for representation by a foreign 
lawyer.227  It is not surprising that such defendants would encounter 
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difficulties in finding adequate local representation.  The government’s use 
of market power, accounting for around 60 percent of the capitalization of 
the Singapore Stock Exchange, includes a lot of business for law firms.  This 
has even been said to encourage lawyers to avoid confrontation with the 
government.228  If judicial interpretation of the rule of law in Singapore 
means that defendants might forego adequate legal representation, then it 
must be questioned as to whether Singapore’s rule of law attains sufficient 
meritorious value to be worthy of protection. 
IV. INCREASING UNCERTAINTY IN SINGAPORE’S COMMON LAW 
A. Precedent Set by Recent Cases 
Whilst Singapore’s government might hope that the strong message 
sent by the judiciary in the recent defamation and contempt decisions will 
relax debate on Singapore’s legal system, it is likely that the converse will be 
true.  This issue of adequate legal representation reminds us in a very real 
and confronting manner of the practical implications the court’s decisions 
have on Singapore’s rule of law.  This issue can be placed in the wider 
context of the recent defamation and contempt judgments, themselves so 
edifying of the relationship between the courts, the government, and the role 
of law in Singapore.  These decisions exemplify how Singapore’s 
defamation laws are used to promote a judicially accepted procedural 
framework within which the rule of law is weakened.  
A subsidiary ground for the defamation actions launched in both Lee 
Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party and Review Publishing Co. Ltd. 
v. Lee Hsien Loong might have been to justify the plaintiffs’ role in the NKF 
scandal, and to avoid damage to the reputation of Singapore, perceived as so 
crucial to its economic and political legitimacy.  However, another purpose 
for the lawsuits may have been that the plaintiffs do not want to risk one of 
their key ideological foundations becoming unstuck.  If they let the 
comments pass without resort to litigation, and Singapore’s economy 
continues to thrive, this would cast doubt on the PAP’s rhetoric of 
Singapore’s exceptional fragility without one of its key foundational pillars 
and, moreover, would open the door to the public articulation of critique.  
This would mean that insisting on the importance of a stable economy is 
merely a pretext behind the intended purpose of consolidating statist rule. 
The precedent set by the two sets of cases is unambiguous: any 
comments regarded by Lee Hsien Loong or Lee Kuan Yew as defamatory 
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will be met with defamation suits in Singapore’s courts, where it is possible 
that no trial will take place and summary judgment might be awarded.  Any 
comments made either outside or within the courts, which question the 
independence of Singapore’s judiciary, will be punishable for contempt of 
court.  Whilst it is undisputed that in any jurisdiction such criticism leveled 
at both the executive and the judiciary would not pass without examination, 
the approach taken by Singapore’s government to allow criticism to become 
increasingly vociferous and to continue the approach of the past four 
decades without further reflection can only have a pejorative impact on 
perceptions of the nature of Singapore’s common law.  
B. Impact on the Government’s Economic Agenda 
The rule of law in Singapore might appear at times to be more a rule 
of economics.  Singapore’s rule of law might seem to be merely a balancing 
exercise between economic prosperity and individual freedom, the balance 
leaning towards prioritization of the former.  However, the Diceyian rule of 
law is exactly that—a rule.  It is not to be derogated from.  Instead, this rule 
of law seeks to support competing rights, without which they would have no 
substance.  Rights are bare without the rule of law.  Lee Kuan Yew’s 
acceptance of a thin rule of law, justified by reference to economic 
considerations, distorts the “rule” of law.  These economic arguments 
become a competing policy consideration and diminish the capacity of the 
rule of law to provide substance to the rights it seeks to protect.  
Moreover, the commercial viability of the current divergent judicial 
approach might be untenable in the long-term, insofar as it has the potential 
to destabilize Singapore’s common law through creating inherent uncertainty 
in all legal precedents.  This is in stark contrast to a position advocated by 
Yong, C.J. in 2001, when his Honor stated that: 
 
Singapore is a nation which is based wholly on the Rule of Law 
… .  It is the certainty which an environment based on the Rule 
of Law guarantees which gives our people … and other foreign 
investors, the confidence to invest in our physical, industrial as 
well as social infrastructure.229  
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The potential erosion of this confidence would be damaging to Singapore’s 
economy and therefore reconsideration by Singapore’s political elite of 
issues raised in this article is warranted. 
In neither the case of Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party 
nor in the case of Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong would 
Dicey’s tenets of the rule of law be satisfied.  The application of the law is 
arbitrary insofar as certain foreign publications are allowed uncircumscribed 
circulation, 230 and the executive is given preference over the opposition to 
voice its views, which also means the law is not applied equally to those 
groups.231  Further, such an arbitrary and unequal application of the law does 
not protect the rights of foreign media or opposition politicians to basic 
political freedom, and certainly does not protect the rights of Singapore’s 
citizens.232  Singapore’s thin and statist rule of law continues to diverge from 
the rule of law in other jurisdictions to which Singapore strives to maintain 
continuity with precedent in commercial cases.  There is a need to recognize 
that any balancing exercise between economic prosperity and individual 
freedom is at odds with the approach taken in other common law 
jurisdictions, where instead economics and individual rights go hand in 
hand.   
The divergent nature of Singapore’s common law might be of concern 
to foreign corporations operating in what to date has been a haven in a 
region beset by political instability and corruption.  It appears that 
companies are willing to openly question the viability of Singapore as an 
acceptable forum for the settlement of commercial disputes.  In Oakwell 
Engineering v. Enernorth Industries,233 an application to enforce a 
Singaporean judgment in Ontario was opposed on the basis that there is an 
institutional bias in Singapore’s courts and that Singapore’s justice system 
was contrary to the Canadian concept of justice.  Ontario’s Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision at first instance to enforce the judgment.234  At first 
instance, Day, J. held that Singapore’s courts “have a reputation for fairness 
in deciding cases between private commercial parties.”235  Whilst the 
defendant tendered evidence in respect of possible government interference 
in trials, Day, J. found that such evidence pertained only to “political cases,” 
                                           
230
  DICEY, supra note 28, at 188. 
231
  Id. at 193.  
232
  Id. at 195-6.  
233
  Oakwell Eng’g Ltd. v. Enernorth Indus. Inc., [2005] 76 O.R.3d 528 (Can.), aff’d, Oakwell Eng’g 
v. Enernorth Indus., [2006] 81 O.R.3d 288 (Can.); leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, see Enernorth Indus. Inc. v. Oakwell Eng’g Ltd., [2007] 1 S.C.R. ix (Can.).  
234
  Oakwell Eng’g v. Evernorth Indus., [2006] 81 O.R.3d 288 (Can.). 
235
  Oakwell Eng’g Ltd. v. Enernorth Indus. Inc., [2005] 76 O.R.3d 528, 538 (Can.). 
350 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 2 
 
and that the case under consideration was a “commercial case.”236  Whilst 
the defendants provided reports that Singapore’s rule of law does not meet 
the standards of the rule of law in Canada, Day, J. held that such evidence 
went against the “formal legal structure” of Singapore evidenced in its 
constitution and laws.237  Day, J. granted the application for enforcement of 
the Singaporean judgment in the absence of evidence that Singapore’s courts 
are biased when deciding a commercial case between private parties.238 
Both the first instance and appellate judgments show that the 
Canadian judiciary was not inclined to enter into scrutinization of 
Singapore’s judiciary, perhaps in the interests of comity.  That said, Day, J.’s 
judgment might be interpolated to reveal that his Honor did agree that 
“political cases” in Singapore might not necessarily be judged in an unbiased 
manner, by dichotomizing between “political” and “commercial” cases.  
However, his Honor did not expand on when cases might fall into either 
category, and it might be that such a distinction is not so clear-cut.  It is 
unclear to what extent the government would need to have an interest in a 
company or other legal entity for it to be considered a “political” case.  Here, 
the dual state construct yet again becomes unstuck.  It is blurred as to when 
cases in Singapore might be considered political and subject to special 
treatment by the judiciary, which creates uncertainty in Singapore’s common 
law and undermines the government’s economic agenda. 
Oakwell Engineering v. Enernorth Industries is also significant 
because it is likely to create a future trend, in which Singapore’s reputation 
as a center for commercial legal certainty will be subject to examination by 
courts in other jurisdictions.  Whilst Singapore’s courts have legitimized 
their judgments and certainty provided by the legal system through an 
application of common law principles, the increasing divergent attitude 
displayed by the judiciary typifies an exceptionalist platform on which many 
of Singapore’s policies are formulated.  If Singapore’s courts come under 
increasing scrutiny, this is likely to erode the foundations of the certainty 
provided by common law precedent.  Foreign companies would then become 
increasingly reluctant to submit to the jurisdiction of Singapore’s courts and 
they would be less inclined to include Singaporean jurisdiction and/or choice 
of law clauses in their contractual arrangements.  Instead, foreign companies 
would be likely to opt instead for the selection of fora where there is no 
controversy surrounding the state of judicial independence. Again, any such 
actions would be inconsistent with the government’s economic agenda of 
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attracting international investment. The avoidance of Singaporean governing 
law clauses would not only harm Singapore’s law firms, but would also 
result in international investment being directed towards other jurisdictions. 
Moreover, if foreign companies are seeking for their contractual 
arrangements to be governed by laws which provide for commercial 
certainty, then it is doubtful whether Singaporean law is in a position to 
guarantee such certainty.  It might be expected that recognition of other 
supposed conditions “unique” to Singapore has the potential to lead to rapid 
and unanticipated departures from common law precedent.239  Indeed, it 
would be a paradoxical—or at the very least perplexing—state of affairs if 
the cultural relativist approach adopted by Singapore’s judiciary does not 
eventually alter other laws.  There is no justifiable explanation as to why 
these departures might not occur in other areas of the law, including contract 
and company law, and why they instead should be limited to cases 
concerning individual rights.  Whilst it might be argued that Oakwell 
Engineering v. Enernorth Industries shows precisely the opposite, namely 
that commercial cases have in fact been successfully separated from political 
cases, the judiciary’s cultural relativist approach in relation to individual 
rights can only be expected to be considered increasingly anomalous and is 
likely to come under increasing levels of international scrutiny. 
The dual state construct in Singapore, under which commercial law 
remains depoliticized and readily enforceable, has thereby been distorted by 
the increasingly statist rule of law.  Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew, by 
strengthening their rule through a mountain of defamation actions, have 
destabilized the government’s economic agenda—the very outcome which 
their actions have sought to avoid.  Singapore’s common law cannot be 
bifurcated because the government’s economic agenda appears to have 
become undermined through increasing uncertainty in Singapore’s common 
law foundations.  
Singapore’s government is no longer in a position to manipulate the 
concept of the rule of law to construct the perception of effective forms of 
governance in a stable and prosperous market,240 at the same time using 
these arguments of effective governance to reinforce illiberal political 
practices.241  Commercial law can no longer remain depoliticized to 
encourage investment, facilitated through strong legal institutions,242 given 
that it has been subjected to increasing levels of international scrutiny.  If 
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Singapore is to maintain a rule of law, which is respected by others, then the 
rule of law can no longer be used as a legitimating ideology to show that the 
economy is strong, but at the same time to silence political opposition and 
rule through law. 243  Singapore’s rule of law has peaked in its ability to 
reinforce and provide for an expansion and rationalization of state power.  
Singapore has a unitary system of common law, and it cannot reasonably be 
expected that those who have been satisfied to use Singapore law to govern 
their commercial transactions will not begin to question where political 
influence stops and certainty of common law precedent begins. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The recent defamatory and contemptuous allegations of corruption 
leveled against both the executive and the judiciary not only struck at the 
heart of Singapore’s ideological, corruption-free platform buttressed by 
judicial independence, but also brought into question the extent to which the 
approach emphasized by both the judiciary and the executive is tenable in 
the long-term without eroding the government’s economic agenda.  This 
article raises confronting questions for those with interests in Singapore’s 
legal system.  It casts doubt on the extent to which judicial acceptance of the 
government’s politics of communitarian legalism will not infiltrate 
Singapore’s commercial law.  Judicial normalization of a statist rule of law, 
of which but one example is the manner in which defamation laws are 
applied to chill political opposition, determines that no area of Singapore’s 
common law can remain forever depoliticized and readily enforceable, and 
that any boundaries between “political” cases and “commercial” cases will 
only become ever more distorted and uncertain.  This contention has been 
reached following consideration of several key issues. 
First, Singapore’s use of the rule of law as an economic asset means 
that the analysis of the applicability of such a normative and Eurocentric 
jurisprudential concept to an Asian legal system is justified.  The value of 
Singapore’s rule of law depends on how law in Singapore is conceived.  
Irrespective of whether a preference for a thick rule of law and an 
independent judiciary might be seen as a Western approach, it has been 
shown that under Singapore’s cultural relativist approach, the statist, 
procedural, thin rule of law is used as a tool to entice economic investment, 
without concern as to whether laws on individual rights and freedoms are 
fair, just, or reasonable.  The judiciary has accepted the PAP’s exceptionalist 
platform that Singapore is vulnerable and in so doing affords additional 
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protection to the executive at the expense of individual rights.  The 
relationship between the executive and the judiciary has become so close 
that their interaction might be better characterized as a division of power 
within the executive, rather than some broader separation of powers. 
Second, restrictions on freedom of speech in Singapore discourage the 
public from becoming politically active.  Defamation laws in Singapore give 
greater rights to those in positions of power, which is indicative of 
Singapore’s selective judicial application of common law precedent.  Under 
the Singapore Chill, the risks of legal liability are so substantial that the law 
deters Singaporeans and others from criticizing the government and instead 
persuades them to maintain their silence.  
Third, the recent sets of defamation and contempt cases have 
significant implications for the state of Singapore’s legal system.  The cases 
highlight that neither the executive nor the judiciary will tolerate accusations 
of corruption leveled against Singapore’s system of governance.  The 
precedent for opposition politicians, foreign publications, and anyone 
considering accusing the executive of corruption and the judiciary of lacking 
independence, is unmistakable: defamation suits and contempt proceedings 
will be used to defend the government’s reputation whenever it is brought 
into question.  Defendants might expect to encounter difficulties in obtaining 
adequate legal representation in Singapore’s courts.  
Finally, the applicability of any dual state construct in Singapore is an 
unsatisfactory explanation for the government’s justification of the adequacy 
of Singapore’s legal system.  It can never be clear as to where the divide 
between political and commercial cases lies, and the determination of the 
judiciary to diverge from sound common law precedent based on the 
recognition of conditions “unique” to Singapore creates uncertainty in 
Singapore’s common law.  This has the potential to frustrate the 
government’s economic agenda of effective governance in a strong and 
stable corruption-free market economy, as foreign players might become 
disinclined to use Singapore law to govern their transactions, or Singapore’s 
courts as an appropriate forum for the resolution of their commercial 
disputes.  Until such time as the Singapore Chill lifts, it should only be 
expected that the legitimacy of Singapore’s legal system will be the subject 
of progressively more intensive debate, which can only serve to damage the 
government’s priority of securing economic prosperity for the future. 
 
 
